Al-Shabaab and China's Strategic Exposure in the Horn of Africa
How a Somali Insurgency Threatens Regional Stability, Maritime Security and Belt and Road Interests
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin remains one of the most resilient and adaptive jihadist organisations in East Africa, with regional implications including destabilisation of neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, increased cross-border violence, and potential spillover effects into regional security frameworks. Further analysis of these regional impacts can enhance strategic planning.
The group continues to prioritise attritional warfare, interdiction of government mobility, degradation of intelligence and special forces capabilities, and selective psychological signalling operations.
No structural fragmentation or operational collapse is observable. While counterterrorism efforts have imposed costs, the group’s resilience underscores the importance of sustained, coordinated efforts to maintain regional stability and reinforce collective commitment.
📌 Inside this Assessment:
Overview and Security Threat Assessment
Operational Evolution, January to May 2026
Chinese Interests and Security Risks in the Horn of Africa
Strategic Assessment and Conclusions
Risk and Threat Overview
Overview and Security Threat Assessment
Despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts, external influences, including regional support and international engagement, continue to shape al-Shabaab’s resilience, underscoring the need for comprehensive regional strategies.
Since mid-February 2025, al-Shabaab’s large-scale, coordinated offensives in central Somalia indicate a strategic shift from attritional violence to territorial contestation, requiring heightened vigilance among security stakeholders. The campaign targeted Middle Shabelle and Hiiran, focusing on Somali National Army positions, African Union forces, and clan militias, aiming to reverse 2022 territorial losses along strategic towns, supply routes, and population centres. A coordinated offensive in central Somalia marked a clear shift from attritional violence to territorial contestation. The campaign has primarily targeted the regions of Middle Shabelle and Hiiran, focusing on Somali National Army positions, African Union forces, and pro-government clan militias. The offensive represents a deliberate effort to reverse the territorial losses suffered during the 2022 Somali government–African Union campaign, particularly along strategic towns, supply corridors, and population hubs.
The operation began on 15 February 2025 with synchronised assaults against multiple Somali military installations, combining ground attacks, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and follow-on infantry manoeuvres. Several towns and villages were temporarily seized, while numerous forward operating bases and camps were overrun or destroyed. The group systematically documented these operations through high-quality photo and video releases, indicating a deliberate information-operations component aimed at signalling momentum, inevitability, and state weakness.
Beyond kinetic activity, al-Shabaab continues to consolidate control through a multi-layered governance-and-coercion model, even in areas nominally held by the government. This includes political and religious penetration, targeted assassinations, systematic taxation, and narrative dominance, which collectively sustain the group’s influence and complicate counter-insurgency efforts.
Political and religious penetration, leveraging clerics, mosques, Sharia courts, and sermons to normalise al-Shabaab authority and delegitimise federal institutions.
Targeted assassinations of elders, district officials, mayors, and clan intermediaries, designed to decapitate local governance and deter collaboration with the state.
Systematic taxation and extortion, including the collection of zakat in government-controlled zones, underscore the group’s parallel administrative reach.
Narrative dominance, portraying the return of Sharia governance while framing the Somali government as corrupt, externally controlled, and incapable of providing security or justice.
During the fighting, both the United States Africa Command and Ethiopia conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab targets, following repeated requests for support from Mogadishu. While these strikes imposed tactical costs, they did not disrupt the insurgency’s overall operational tempo.
After consolidating gains and exerting sustained pressure in Middle Shabelle and Hiiran, areas where al-Shabaab retains deep logistical and social networks, the group is now expanding its focus toward Lower Shabelle and Bay regions. This shift suggests a phased campaign design aimed at stretching government forces, exploiting overextension, and reasserting insurgent dominance across multiple operational theatres.
Al-Shabaab actively shapes the battlespace through synchronised military, governance, and information operations, maintaining strategic initiative in key regions. Without sustained territorial control and effective governance, the threat remains high in 2025, with a credible risk of further territorial setbacks for the Somali state, actively shaping the battlespace and impacting regional stability. Its ability to synchronise military offensives, governance mechanisms, and information operations indicates that the group retains strategic initiative in key regions.