Cognitive Domain Assessment | Strategic Implications of JNIM’s Campaign
From Tactical Raids to Sovereignty Erosion.
Executive Intelligence Summary
This paper examines the visual production of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali and Burkina Faso throughout 2025, analysing jihadist video and image material as a component of cognitive warfare and operational messaging, rather than as post-hoc propaganda. Drawing exclusively on primary-source jihadist content disseminated through official and semi-official channels, the study applies a multi-disciplinary analytical framework combining SOCMINT, IMINT, digital HUMINT inference, and cognitive-domain analysis.
The findings indicate that JNIM’s visual output functions as an operational multiplier integrated into the group’s kill chain, supporting learning, deterrence, recruitment, and reputational warfare. Recurrent visual patterns, including massed motorcycle manoeuvres, night-time operations, the use of unmanned aerial systems for ISR and battle damage assessment, indirect fire, and episodic SVBIED employment, suggest a deliberate effort to standardise tactics and signal tactical maturation to multiple audiences. Targeting narratives consistently prioritise state outposts, logistical corridors, security intermediaries (police, gendarmerie, and community militias), and, in selected cases, foreign security partners, reflecting a coherent strategy aimed at eroding practical sovereignty rather than achieving permanent territorial control.
The paper argues that JNIM’s 2025 visual campaign constitutes a form of cognitive-operational convergence. In this visibility, itself becomes a weapon: shaping threat perception, delegitimising state authority, and amplifying the psychological effects of limited kinetic actions. These dynamics carry significant implications for military posture, counter-insurgency strategy, partner engagement, and security risk assessments across the central Sahel.
Key Judgments
JNIM’s visual production in 2025 should be assessed as an integral element of its operational architecture, not as ancillary propaganda. Video and imagery are systematically used to extend the effects of kinetic actions into the cognitive domain, shaping perceptions of control, inevitability, and state vulnerability.
The group demonstrates increasing tactical standardisation and learning, as evidenced by the repeated visual presentation of mass motorcycle manoeuvres, coordinated assaults on isolated positions, night-time engagements, indirect fire, and the selective use of SVBIEDs. These patterns indicate internal dissemination of best practices and doctrinal consolidation.
Visual media functions as a force multiplier by compressing the operational learning cycle. Footage serves simultaneously as battle damage assessment, internal training material, recruitment content, and deterrent signalling, reducing the need for sustained territorial control to achieve strategic effects.
Target selection within the visual narrative is deliberate and strategically coherent, focusing on state outposts, logistical corridors, security intermediaries (including police, gendarmerie, and VDP units), and symbolic nodes of authority. This reflects a strategy of eroding practical sovereignty and governance capacity rather than seeking conventional battlefield dominance.
The recurrent portrayal of attacks involving foreign security partners, including Russian Africa Corps elements, highlights a reputational warfare component, aimed at undermining the perceived deterrent value of external assistance and contesting partner-centric stabilisation narratives.
Geographic emphasis differs by theatre but follows a shared cognitive logic: in Mali, visual messaging prioritises logistical interdiction and state–partner vulnerability; in Burkina Faso, it focuses on community-level security structures and emblematic locations such as Djibo, which function as both operational and symbolic battlegrounds.
The cumulative effect of JNIM’s visual campaign is disproportionate to its kinetic footprint, amplifying fear, uncertainty, and behavioural adaptation among security forces, local populations, and international stakeholders. This underscores the necessity of treating visual dominance and narrative contestation as core components of counter-insurgency and security risk management in the Sahel.
Methodology
Source Material and Data Integrity
This study is based exclusively on primary-source jihadist material disseminated by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) through its official and semi-official media channels, primarily the az-Zallaqa Media Foundation and affiliated outlets. The corpus consists of video productions and extracted visual frames documenting attacks, raids, ambushes, and post-attack scenes across Mali and Burkina Faso between January and December 2025.
The dataset was deliberately restricted to first-order sources, excluding secondary reporting, media summaries, or third-party interpretations. This methodological choice prioritises direct observation of self-representation, operational signalling, and internal narrative construction over externally mediated accounts. While jihadist media content is inherently selective and performative, it remains one of the most reliable windows into operational preferences, learning processes, and intended cognitive effects.
All materials were reviewed in their original form, with metadata (date, location, target attribution) cross-checked against internal consistency within the corpus and, where relevant, corroborated through open-source contextual validation.
Analytical Framework
The analysis applies an integrated, multi-domain framework that combines tools traditionally used in intelligence analysis with concepts from cognitive warfare and insurgency studies. Specifically, the following analytical lenses were employed:
SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence):
Used to assess narrative framing, audience targeting, repetition of themes, and temporal clustering of releases. SOCMINT analysis focuses not on engagement metrics, but on what is shown, how it is displayed, and why particular events are elevated into flagship productions.IMINT (Imagery Intelligence):
Visual material was analysed for observable tactical features, including force composition, mobility platforms, weapons employment, night-time operations, indirect fire, use of unmanned aerial systems, and post-engagement behaviour. IMINT was applied conservatively, with clear separation between observable facts and inferred capabilities.Digital HUMINT Inference:
While no direct human sources were involved, behavioural patterns visible in the footage—such as discipline, coordination, action sequencing, and internal consistency across operations—were used to infer organisational learning, command intent, and levels of tactical maturity.Cognitive Warfare Analysis:
The core analytical lens of the paper. Visual material is treated as a deliberate instrument of influence, designed to shape perception, behaviour, and decision-making among multiple audiences: local populations, state security forces, auxiliary militias, foreign partners, and potential recruits.
This integrated approach allows the paper to move beyond descriptive cataloguing and towards an assessment of how visual production functions as an operational and strategic enabler.
Units of Analysis
The analysis operates across three interconnected units:
Event-level analysis
Each attack or operation represented in the corpus is treated as a discrete analytical unit, defined by time, location, and target type.Visual-sequence analysis
Within each event, specific visual sequences (e.g., approach, engagement, aftermath, aerial footage) are analysed to identify tactical and cognitive signalling choices.Indicator-level analysis
Recurrent visual indicators—such as massed motorcycle manoeuvre, night operations, drone footage, indirect fire, or the display of destroyed equipment—are coded and compared across events to identify patterns and standardisation.
This layered structure enables the identification of both micro-level tactical signals and macro-level campaign logic.
Coding and Inference Rules
To mitigate analytical overreach, strict inference rules were applied:
Observable vs. inferred separation:
Only elements directly visible in the material are treated as facts. Assessments regarding capability, intent, or learning are explicitly framed as analytical inferences.Recurrence threshold:
A tactic or feature is considered analytically significant only if it appears repeatedly across different events or theatres, or if it is integrated into multi-phase operations.Contextual coherence:
Visual indicators are interpreted in relation to operational context (target type, geography, timing), not in isolation.Non-assumptive attribution:
Claims regarding foreign partners, specific units, or outcomes are treated as part of JNIM’s narrative unless independently verifiable. The analytical focus remains on why such claims are made, rather than on their literal accuracy.
Limitations and Analytical Constraints
Propaganda Bias and Selection Effects
JNIM’s visual output is inherently selective. Failed operations, tactical setbacks, and internal losses are systematically excluded. As a result, the corpus does not provide a statistically representative picture of operational success rates or attrition. The analysis therefore focuses on capability signalling and preferences, rather than on quantitative effectiveness.
Temporal and Narrative Compression
Video productions frequently compress time, omit pauses, and merge sequences from different phases of an operation. This limits the ability to reconstruct precise timelines or the duration of engagement. Consequently, the paper avoids detailed tactical timelines and instead concentrates on sequencing logic and narrative construction.
Geospatial and Attribution Uncertainty
While locations and dates are generally provided by the producing entity and show internal consistency, independent geolocation and forensic verification were not systematically applied. Attribution to specific sub-units or commanders is therefore avoided. The analysis remains focused on organisation-wide patterns rather than granular unit-level claims.
Ambiguity of Technological Function
The presence of drones, indirect fire systems, or complex manoeuvres does not automatically imply advanced or integrated capabilities. In particular, aerial footage may serve purely propagandistic purposes rather than operational ISR. Where such ambiguity exists, the analysis explicitly distinguishes potential capability from demonstrated function.
Cognitive Overinterpretation Risk
Cognitive Warfare analysis carries an inherent risk of over-reading intentionality into media artefacts. To mitigate this, the paper grounds all cognitive interpretations in repetition, consistency, and alignment with kinetic actions, avoiding speculative psychological profiling or intent attribution unsupported by observable patterns.
Scope Limitation
This paper does not attempt to assess:
JNIM’s internal command structure,
comparative casualty ratios,
or the effectiveness of countermeasures employed by state or partner forces.
Such assessments would require classified reporting, persistent ISR, or human intelligence beyond the scope of this study.
Conceptual Framework: Visual Media as a Cognitive-Operational Weapon
From Propaganda to Operational Messaging
Conventional analyses often treat jihadist video output as propaganda in the classical sense: material produced after an operation, intended primarily for ideological reinforcement, recruitment, or external visibility. This paper adopts a different conceptual position.