From Narrative to Threat: How al-Qaeda Frames the United Arab Emirates in Contemporary Jihadist Discourse
Narrative Delegitimisation, Cognitive Warfare, and Security Implications
🔹Abstract
Between late October and early November 2025, the al-Qaeda-linked media ecosystem produced a series of content outlining a growing and coherent hostile narrative toward the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), through their respective official media outlets Al-Malahem Media and As-Sahab Subcontinent, developed convergent messages presenting the UAE as a central and morally responsible actor in an alleged regional architecture of violence, repression, and international complicity.
The analysis examines how two media products with different languages and audiences—AQAP’s video on the conflict in Sudan and AQIS’s Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine—converge toward a common strategic objective: the delegitimisation of the UAE by bridging multiple crisis theatres, particularly Sudan (Darfur/El-Fasher), Yemen, and the normalisation process with Israel.
AQAP favours highly emotional communication, grounded in moral shock and the urgency of action, while AQIS adopts a pseudo-analytic register that mimics the language of security and international relations, making the narrative more palatable to educated and diasporic audiences.
The paper argues that this convergence is not a simple propaganda episode, but rather a deliberate process of narrative targeting, aimed at transforming the United Arab Emirates from a legitimate political actor into an ideologically justified target. The resulting threat is predominantly cognitive and reputational in nature in the short term, but it creates the conditions for a possible operational escalation in the medium term, especially in regional contexts characterised by high security fragility. Understanding this dynamic is essential to correctly assess contemporary jihadist risk and to develop effective responses that integrate security, diplomacy, and information management.
Methodology and analytical approach: This work is based on an intelligence-driven methodological approach, founded on the direct analysis of primary sources produced by jihadist organisations themselves, particularly official media materials attributable to al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The objective was not to interpret such content through the filter of secondary literature, but rather to examine it as operational objects, intentionally produced to influence the perceptions, orientations, and behaviours of specific audiences.
The methodology adopted integrates elements of continuous monitoring, IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), digital HUMINT, and qualitative discourse analysis, following a logic typical of studies applied to security and counterterrorism. The materials analysed include editorial products (digital magazines), official videos, posters, textual statements, and graphic materials distributed through the official media channels of the organisations examined. These materials were treated as authentic primary sources, attributed based on branding elements, established distribution channels, and stylistic consistency with previous productions.
The absence of traditional bibliographic references or footnote citations is not due to a lack of documentation, but rather to a methodological choice consistent with the nature of the work. This study is not intended as a theoretical review or an analysis mediated by secondary journalistic or academic sources, but rather as an exercise in analytical exploitation of original materials produced by hostile non-state actors. In the field of applied intelligence and security studies, these materials are not “cited” in the traditional academic sense, but are analysed, decomposed, and interpreted as operational evidence.
The IMINT analysis focused specifically on the visual elements of the examined products: image composition, iconographic choice, recurring symbols, time markers, graphic layout, use of colours and contrasts, as well as the relationship between images of suffering, combat, and ideological legitimacy. These elements were considered an integral part of the message and not mere aesthetic supports, in line with the evolution of jihadist propaganda towards highly strategic forms of visual communication.
At the same time, the digital HUMINT approach allowed the materials to be placed within their communication ecosystem: publication frequency, temporal synchronisation between products from different organisations, linguistic adaptation to specific audiences (Arabic and Urdu), and consistency with previously observed narratives. Attention was not focused on individual pieces of content, but on the production and release pattern, considered indicative.
Methodology and Analytical Approach
This study adopts an intelligence-driven analytical approach, grounded in the direct examination of primary-source materials produced by jihadist organisations themselves. The analysis is based exclusively on official media outputs attributable to al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), treated as operational artefacts intentionally designed to influence perceptions, judgments, and behaviours of specific target audiences.
Rather than interpreting these materials through the lens of secondary academic or journalistic literature, the study approaches them as strategic communication products, embedded within a broader ecosystem of jihadist media production. The objective is not to assess the factual accuracy of the claims advanced by these organisations, but to analyse their narrative construction, communicative intent, and security-relevant implications.
Methodologically, the analysis integrates elements of continuous monitoring, IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), digital HUMINT, and qualitative discourse analysis, in line with established practices in applied security and counterterrorism studies. The corpus includes digital magazines, official videos, posters, textual statements, and graphic materials disseminated through recognised official media outlets. Attribution is based on consistent branding, established distribution channels, and stylistic continuity with previous productions.
Visual analysis (IMINT) focuses on compositional choices, iconography, symbolic references, temporal markers, and the relationship between imagery of suffering, combat, and ideological legitimacy. These visual elements are treated as integral components of the message rather than as secondary or aesthetic features.
The digital HUMINT component situates individual products within their broader communication ecosystem, examining publication timing, synchronisation across different al-Qaeda affiliates, language adaptation to specific audiences (Arabic and Urdu), and narrative continuity over time. Emphasis is placed on patterns of production and release, considered more indicative of strategic intent than isolated content items.
Overall, the methodology reflects the logic of threat assessment, with particular attention to narrative targeting, cognitive influence, and the conditions under which communicative hostility may translate into elevated security risk.
Note on the Use of Extremist Material
This study analyses materials produced by jihadist organisations designated as extremist and violent exclusively for purposes of research, monitoring, and defensive threat assessment. All examined content is treated as an analytical object and is critically contextualised within a security and intelligence framework.
No material is reproduced in full, translated verbatim, or presented in a manner that could contribute to dissemination or amplification. The focus remains on understanding communication strategies, narrative mechanisms, and their security implications, in accordance with established ethical standards in the study of violent extremism and counterterrorism.
Note on Analytical Limitations
The analysis is subject to several intrinsic limitations that warrant explicit acknowledgement. First, the study focuses on official communication outputs of the organisations examined and does not include a systematic assessment of audience reception, engagement metrics, or measurable impact in terms of radicalisation and recruitment.
Second, access to some materials was partial, most notably the absence of the full AQAP video content, which constrains fine-grained stylistic and rhetorical analysis in certain respects. Third, the study adopts a qualitative and interpretative perspective, consistent with an intelligence-oriented approach, and does not seek to provide probabilistic estimates regarding the imminence of specific operational actions.
These limitations do not undermine the validity of the assessment, which is based on converging narrative patterns, cross-product consistency, and the strategic coherence of the messaging analysed.
Terminological Note
In this study, the term propaganda refers to communication products deliberately designed to shape perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours, and should not be understood as synonymous with improvised or strategically unstructured messaging.
The concept of threat is employed in a broad analytical sense, encompassing cognitive, reputational, and strategic dimensions in addition to purely operational or kinetic ones.
The term cognitive warfare is used to describe influence operations aimed at shaping the cognitive environment and decision-making processes of individuals and communities, and is distinguished from narrower or episodic forms of disinformation.
Corpus of Materials Analysed
The analysis is based on the direct examination of the following primary materials, attributed to the official media outlets of the jihadist organisations under consideration:
al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind, monthly issue for October 2025, published on 7 November 2025.
Media wing: As-Sahab Subcontinent.
Format: Digital magazine (magazine/dossier).al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Video titled “Sudan, the Nation’s Forgotten Wound”, released on 7 November 2025.
Two-page statement titled “Statement on the Systematic Crimes of Arab Zionists Against Our Muslim People in Sudan”, published on 8 November 2025.
Media wing: Al-Malahem Media.
Format: Propaganda video accompanied by official poster and textual statement.
All materials were analysed in their original form and treated as authentic primary sources for monitoring, IMINT, digital HUMINT, and intelligence assessment purposes.
Product Profile and Attribution
The analysis of media products attributable to AQIS and AQAP begins not with content alone, but with communicative form as a strategic choice. In both cases, the medium itself is not neutral: it is an integral component of the message and of its intended operational effect.
Contemporary jihadist media products are designed not only to convey specific claims but to structure how those claims are processed cognitively, emotionally, and politically. Format, visual language, pacing, and editorial architecture all contribute to shaping audience perception and legitimising particular interpretive frames.
Accordingly, the following analysis treats AQIS and AQAP media outputs as purpose-built instruments of influence, whose form, tone, and distribution patterns are as analytically significant as their explicit textual content.
Analytical Assessment: Narrative Targeting and Threat Construction