Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin — Strategic Threat Outlook | December 2025
Operational Trends, Regional Risk, and Forecast
Executive Intelligence Summary
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin remains one of the most resilient and operationally capable jihadist organisations in East Africa, posing a persistent and multidimensional threat to Somalia and neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya.
In December 2025, al-Shabaab activity reflects:
sustained pressure against Somali security forces and government targets;
continued use of complex and asymmetric attack methods;
A stable operational posture despite ongoing counterterrorism and military pressure.
No major strategic shift is observed during the reporting period; however, the group’s ability to sustain operational tempo and project violence regionally confirms a high and enduring threat level over the next 3–6 months.
Threat level: High
Trend: → (stable)
Primary risk areas: Somalia; cross-border risk to Kenya
Time horizon: 3–6 months
Confidence level: Medium–High
Scope and Methodology
This Strategic Threat Outlook is based on:
systematic monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims);
reporting from sources in the field;
Integration of OSINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, and Digital HUMINT.
Sources include primary material disseminated through al-Shabaab–affiliated channels, open-source reporting, official statements, and local sources.
Limitations
Incomplete or delayed reporting from contested or remote areas;
exaggeration or omission in group claims;
Propaganda bias and potential disinformation.
Where verification is not possible, this is explicitly noted in the assessment.
Overview and Security Threat Assessment
Despite sustained counterterrorism operations by the Somali federal government, allied clan militias, and international partners, al-Shabaab remains the most consequential and resilient threat to the Somali state. While overall attack volume showed a marginal decline in 2024, this reduction did not translate into strategic degradation. Instead, al-Shabaab adapted its operational profile, preserving high lethality, territorial influence, and coercive capacity.
Since mid-February 2025, al-Shabaab has launched a large-scale, coordinated offensive in central Somalia, marking a clear shift from attritional violence to territorial contestation. The campaign has primarily targeted the regions of Middle Shabelle and Hiiran, focusing on Somali National Army positions, African Union forces, and pro-government clan militias. The offensive represents a deliberate effort to reverse the territorial losses suffered during the 2022 Somali government–African Union campaign, particularly along strategic towns, supply corridors, and population hubs.
The operation began on 15 February 2025 with synchronised assaults against multiple Somali military installations, combining ground attacks, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and follow-on infantry manoeuvres. Several towns and villages were temporarily seized, while numerous forward operating bases and camps were overrun or destroyed. The group systematically documented these operations through high-quality photo and video releases, indicating a deliberate information-operations component aimed at signalling momentum, inevitability, and state weakness.
Beyond kinetic activity, al-Shabaab continues to consolidate control through a multi-layered governance and coercion model, even in areas nominally held by the government. This includes:
Political and religious penetration, leveraging clerics, mosques, Sharia courts, and sermons to normalise al-Shabaab authority and delegitimise federal institutions.
Targeted assassinations of elders, district officials, mayors, and clan intermediaries, designed to decapitate local governance and deter collaboration with the state.
Systematic taxation and extortion, including the collection of zakat in government-controlled zones, underscore the group’s parallel administrative reach.
Narrative dominance, portraying the return of Sharia governance while framing the Somali government as corrupt, externally controlled, and incapable of providing security or justice.
During the fighting, both the United States Africa Command and Ethiopia conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab targets, following repeated requests for support from Mogadishu. While these strikes imposed tactical costs, they did not disrupt the overall operational tempo of the insurgency.
After consolidating gains and exerting sustained pressure in Middle Shabelle and Hiiran—areas where al-Shabaab retains deep logistical and social networks—the group is now expanding its focus toward Lower Shabelle and Bay regions. This shift suggests a phased campaign design aimed at stretching government forces, exploiting overextension, and reasserting insurgent dominance across multiple operational theatres.
Assessment: al-Shabaab is not merely enduring pressure; it is actively shaping the battlespace. Its ability to synchronise military offensives, governance mechanisms, and information operations indicates that the group retains strategic initiative in key regions. Absent sustained territorial control, effective local governance, and disruption of al-Shabaab’s parallel administration, the threat trajectory for 2025 remains high and structurally persistent, with a credible risk of further territorial rollback by the Somali state.
Al-Shabaab activities – December 2025
December 2025 showed a marked “dual-track” operational pattern: sustained rural insurgency pressure in the Shabelle/Juba belts, paired with a noticeable sharpening of high-visibility, capital-centric disruption attempts designed to signal reach, contest state legitimacy, and exploit political frictions around electoral reforms and governance milestones.