Intelligence Brief | Eyes on Jihadism. Monitoring Jihadist Propaganda
Issue #169 - Week 1 - 8 July
Executive Intelligence Overview
This weekly intelligence brief documents and structures official jihadist propaganda output released between 1 and 8 July, providing structured situational awareness across multiple organisations and theatres.
This brief highlights operational claims and targets, emphasising their importance for threat recognition and strategic focus, aiding analysts and policymakers in understanding ongoing threats and their strategic implications.
The purpose of this product is to support systematic monitoring, providing reassurance to analysts and policymakers that threat trends are being tracked thoroughly and that their efforts are crucial to understanding threats.
This publication does not include threat assessments, intent evaluation, or operational forecasting. Those components are addressed separately in dedicated analytical outputs.
🔹 Scope of Monitoring
This issue covers all identifiable official propaganda from a predefined list of jihadist groups, selected for operational relevance and threat level, during the reporting period, enhancing situational awareness.
The focus on documentation, classification, and structured presentation of primary-source material aims to instil confidence in analysts and policymakers about the reliability of the data used for threat assessment.
🔹 Sources & Collection Methodology
The analysis relies solely on primary-source propaganda, such as official magazines, videos, photos, statements, claims, and audio recordings, to clarify the scope of sources and bolster the reliability of the data for threat assessment.
Official magazines,
Videos,
Photo sets,
Statements and claims of responsibility,
Audio statements.
Material is collected and categorised by organisation, media outlet, and content type.
The study relies on OSINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, and Digital HUMINT collection streams.
No secondary reporting, media commentary, or interpretative overlay is applied.
🔹 Analytical Boundaries & Limitations
Fluctuations in volume, language, or format serve as signals of activity trends that analysts should interpret in a broader context to support accurate threat assessment and avoid overestimating their significance.
They shouldn’t be considered in isolation as indicators of strategic shifts, operational escalation, or changes in intent and capability; instead, they should be analysed within broader intelligence products.
Strategic shifts,
Operational escalation,
Intent or capability changes.
All higher-order analytical interpretation is conducted separately within:
Intelligence Briefs,
Strategic Threat Outlooks,
Cognitive and Information Domain Assessments.
🔹 Monitored Propaganda Output and Weekly Monitoring Notes
This issue includes all primary propaganda material released during the week by:
Al-Qaeda and affiliates
JNIM
Al-Shabaab
Pro-AQ media channels (Al-Bayan Newspaper - Weekly Issue)
Islamic State
al-Naba Newspaper (weekly Issue)
Official IS media channels.
Independent Jihadist Groups
Ittehad Mujahidin Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
People’s Fighters Front
The conclusions are included in the Weekly Monitoring Notes.
Al-Qaeda (AQ)
Az-Zallaqa Media, Jamat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), released a 1-minute 38-second video showing a violent IED attack on a Burkinabe army convoy in the Gnagna province, in the East Region of Burkina Faso.
Az-Zallaqa Media, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), released a 53-second video showing an ambush on a Malian army patrol in the Ségou region of Mali.
Az-Zallaqa Media, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), issued a military statement claiming responsibility for 10 attacks against convoys, checkpoints, barracks, and headquarters belonging to the Malian army, the Russian PMC Africa Corps, and the Dozo militias in the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu, and the Bamako area. Mali
Az-Zallaqa Media, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), issued 21 statements and 15 photos, claiming 32 attacks.
The targets of the attacks were: Malian Army, Dozo militia, Russian PMC Africa Corps, Burkinabé Army, VDP militia.
The areas of the attacks were :
1) Burkina Faso = 10
- Yatenga province, Sissili province, Loroum province, Séno province, Gourma province, Poni province, Mouhoun province, Sanmatenga province.
2) Mali = 21
- Kayes region, Koulikoro region, Mopti region, Timbuktu region, Segou region, Kidal region; Bamako area.
3) Niger = 1
- Tillaberi region.
The Shahada News Agency, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (AS), released 11 statements claiming responsibility for 21 attacks.
The targets of the attacks were:
Somali Army, Somali Intelligence, Somali Special Forces, Somali pro-government militia, Ethiopian Army, Ugandan Army.
The areas affected by the attacks were:
1) Somalia = 21
- Afgooye area, Janale area, Bulo Marer area, Farsooley area, Mubarak area, Lower Shabelle region; Baidoa area, Qansahdhere area, Bay region; Harardhere area, Mudug region; Mogadiscio area.
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) has published the June–July 2026 issue of its magazine “Nawa’i Ghazwat al-Hind”.
The magazine runs to 107 pages and includes a collection of doctrinal, political and organisational articles relating to Al-Qaeda’s narrative, focusing on Palestine and Gaza, Israel, tensions between India and Pakistan and the role of the United States, boycotting America, etc.
Al-Yaqin, a pro-al-Qaeda media outlet, launched the first issue of a new newsletter, al-Bayan, which will be published every Friday and will consist of 9 pages. This issue features photos and information on attacks carried out by al-Qaeda affiliates, infographics, and an editorial.
Islamic State (IS)
The official media of the Islamic State published an issue of the weekly al-Naba this week (554). Issue 554, eight pages long, covers the week of 10 to 16 Muharram 1448, from 25 June to 1 July 2026. The main infographic summarises the areas affected by military operations this week, including:
Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
IS claims to have conducted 16 operations in all the mentioned areas and to have caused 64 deaths and injuries.
The Amaq news agency, the official media of the Islamic State, released a 1-minute 12-second video showing an attack carried out by ISCAP militants against a Congolese army patrol in the province of Haute Uele, in the DR Congo.
The Amaq news agency, the official media of the Islamic State, released a 1-minute 12-second video showing an attack carried out by ISCAP militants against a Congolese army barracks in the province of Haute Uele, in the DR Congo.
The Amaq news agency, the official media of the Islamic State, published a lengthy statement claiming responsibility for a massive attack on a Mozambican army barracks by ISM, in the district of Macomia, in the province of Cabo Delgado, in Mozambique.
The official media outlets of the Islamic State published a photo report showing a massive attack on a Mozambican army barracks by ISM, in the district of Macomia, in the province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.
The Amaq News Agency, the official media of the Islamic State, published a lengthy statement claiming responsibility for an attack on a Congolese Army patrol by ISCAP, in the province of Haute Uele, in the DR Congo.
The Amaq News Agency, the official news outlet of the Islamic State, has published a lengthy statement claiming responsibility for two large-scale attacks carried out by ISWAP militants against two Nigerian army camps in Borno State, Nigeria.
Independent Jihadist Groups
Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), a Pakistani jihadist organisation comprising the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HBG), Lashkar-e-Islam and the Harkat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), released 14 statements, claiming 21 attacks.
Target: Pakistan Army, Pakistan Police, Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD), Secret/Peace Committee.
Area:
- North Waziristan district, Khyber district, Bannu district, Orakzai district;
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province;
- Diamer district, Gilgit-Baltistan
Pakistan
Umar Media, a Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) publication, published its usual infographic summarising the attacks conducted in the previous month.
In June, the TTP claimed 336 attacks.
The attacks affected 23 different Pakistani districts. Pakistan
The jihadist organisation in Sistan and Baluchistan, Iran, the “People’s Fighters Front”, released a video lasting over 4 minutes showing the training of its militants. Iran
🔹Weekly Monitoring Notes
Weekly Monitoring Notes
The reporting period from 1 to 8 July reflects a clear increase in propaganda activity across the global jihadist ecosystem, driven primarily by Al-Qaeda affiliates operating in the Sahel and Somalia. Compared with the previous reporting cycle, the volume of official communications rose significantly, while Islamic State maintained a stable but comparatively lower operational profile. The week was characterised by JNIM’s intensified operational reporting in Mali, Al-Shabaab’s sustained battlefield communications, the launch of a new pro-Al-Qaeda weekly publication, and the continued operational tempo of Pakistani jihadist organisations.
Within the Al-Qaeda network, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) recorded one of its most active reporting cycles in recent weeks. Az-Zallaqa Media released 21 statements and 15 photo reports documenting 32 attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Mali accounted for nearly two-thirds of all claimed operations, with activity extending across Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Timbuktu, Ségou, Kidal and the Bamako area. Particularly significant was the military communiqué detailing ten coordinated attacks against Malian military positions, Russian PMC Africa Corps personnel and Dozo militias around Bamako and central Mali. This concentration of attacks illustrates JNIM’s continuing ability to operate simultaneously across multiple operational sectors while maintaining sustained pressure on both national and foreign security actors. The accompanying videos documenting IED attacks and ambushes further reinforce the organisation’s emphasis on portraying tactical effectiveness and operational continuity.
Al-Shabaab also demonstrated a substantial increase in activity, claiming responsibility for twenty-one attacks through eleven official statements. Operations remained concentrated across southern and central Somalia, targeting the Somali Army, intelligence services, Special Forces, pro-government militias, and regional military contingents from Ethiopia and Uganda. Compared with previous weeks, the broader geographic distribution and increased number of claims suggest that Al-Shabaab continues to sustain a high operational tempo while preserving its ability to project simultaneous pressure across several fronts.
Beyond operational reporting, Al-Qaeda’s media ecosystem expanded through the publication of the June–July issue of AQIS’s magazine Nawa’i Ghazwat al-Hind and, more notably, the launch of Al-Bayan, a new weekly newsletter produced by the pro-Al-Qaeda media outlet Al-Yaqin. The establishment of a recurring weekly publication is analytically significant. By combining editorials, operational summaries, photographs, and infographics from multiple Al-Qaeda affiliates, Al-Bayan appears designed to strengthen information integration across the wider Al-Qaeda network and to provide supporters with a consolidated narrative, in format, comparable to long-established weekly publications within the global jihadist media environment.
Islamic State maintained a comparatively restrained but geographically diverse media cycle. Al-Naba issue 554 documented sixteen operations resulting in sixty-four reported deaths and injuries across Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although the number of claimed operations declined compared with previous weeks, the organisation continued to allocate considerable media attention to Africa. Multiple Amaq statements, videos, and photo reports documented operations in Cabo Delgado, Haut-Uélé, and Borno State, confirming that Mozambique, Central Africa, and the Lake Chad Basin remain the organisation’s principal operational and propaganda priorities. Unlike previous reporting cycles, however, no major strategic editorial or leadership communication accompanied the operational reporting.
Independent jihadist organisations remained highly active in Pakistan. Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan claimed twenty-one attacks targeting the Pakistani Army, Police, Counter Terrorism Department and local security structures across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan. Meanwhile, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan published its monthly operational infographic, claiming 336 attacks across twenty-three districts during June. Although monthly statistical products have become routine within TTP communications, they remain valuable indicators of the organisation’s effort to demonstrate sustained operational momentum and territorial reach.
A noteworthy development outside the traditional Pakistani theatre was the publication of a training video by Iran’s People’s Fighters Front. Although the organisation’s operational activity remains limited compared with larger jihadist movements, the release of structured military training footage indicates continued efforts to project organisational development and consolidate its public identity within the militant landscape of Sistan and Baluchistan.
Overall, the reporting period demonstrates a renewed expansion in Al-Qaeda’s propaganda activity, particularly across the Sahel and Somalia, while Islamic State maintained operational continuity without significantly increasing its strategic messaging. The launch of Al-Bayan represents the most important media innovation of the week, suggesting a broader effort to reinforce coherence within the Al-Qaeda information ecosystem. Simultaneously, Pakistani jihadist organisations continue to demonstrate remarkable operational persistence, ensuring that South Asia remains one of the most active theatres in the contemporary global jihadist propaganda landscape.
Distribution patterns remained stable across established encrypted and semi-encrypted platforms (Element, Telegram, Rocket Chat, Chirpwire, Signal, UpScrolled), with no observable shifts in dissemination channels or media architecture.
🔒 Executive Intelligence Cycle
This assessment is part of a broader analytical cycle.
Founding subscribers receive the Executive Intelligence Briefing, which integrates all threat assessments, cognitive domain analysis, and a rolling 30–90-day forecast into a single monthly strategic synthesis.
© Daniele Garofalo Monitoring - All rights reserved.
Daniele Garofalo is an independent researcher and analyst specialising in jihadist terrorism, Islamist insurgencies, and armed non-state actors.
His work focuses on continuous intelligence monitoring, threat assessment, and analysis of propaganda and cognitive/information dynamics, with an emphasis on decision-oriented outputs, early warning, and strategic trend evaluation.
ISSN (International Standard Serial Number): 3103-3520
NATO NCAGE: AX664 (NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity)
UNITED NATIONS Global Marketplace ID: 1210727
ORCID Code: 0009-0006-5289-2874