Islamic State activity in Iraq remained at a very low level throughout much of 2026, reflecting the sustained degradation of the organisation’s operational presence and the continued pressure exerted by Iraqi security forces. September, however, produced a modest change in this pattern. Between 3 and 23 September, Islamic State reporting documented four separate operations in Kirkuk and Anbar, including three IED attacks against Iraqi security forces and an attack that destroyed a thermal surveillance system south of Kirkuk.
Taken individually, these incidents remain limited in scale and tactical complexity. Taken together, however, they indicate that residual Islamic State cells can conduct reconnaissance, access selected operating areas, and translate clandestine presence into intermittent kinetic activity. September’s significance therefore lies less in the number of attacks than in what their geography, targeting, and tactical characteristics reveal about the organisation’s remaining operational capacity.
📌 Inside this Assessment
Signal: A Limited Increase from a Low Baseline
September Operational Picture
Tactical Pattern: IEDs, Mobility and Low-Signature Operations
Kirkuk and Anbar: Persistent Operating Spaces
Targeting Surveillance: A Small but Relevant Indicator
Assessment: Persistence, Not Yet Recovery
Indicators to Watch | Next 30–60 Days
Analytical Outlook
Related Intelligence & Analysis:
Signal: A Limited Increase from a Low Baseline
Activity claimed by the Islamic State in Iraq increased slightly in September 2026 compared to the particularly low levels observed in previous months. Between the beginning of the month and September 23, the organisation’s official propaganda revealed at least four distinct operations, concentrated in the Kirkuk and Anbar provinces. Three involved the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against Iraqi security force vehicles or patrols, while a fourth action, subsequently documented by al-Naba Newspaper, targeted an Iraqi army position, destroying a thermal surveillance camera used to monitor the area.
The quantitative data remains low and, viewed in isolation, is insufficient to support the claim of a structural resurgence of the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq. However, the signal becomes more significant when considering the geographic distribution of incidents in Kirkuk and Anbar, the choice of targets, and operational methods employed. This geographic focus suggests that residual cells are maintaining specific operational footholds, which is critical for security planning.
