Islamic State in Africa — Strategic Threat Outlook | December 2025
Continental Operational Trends, Risk Assessment, and Forecast
Executive Intelligence Summary
Africa remains the primary theatre for the Islamic State’s global operational activity, surpassing the Middle East in terms of attack volume, geographic dispersion, and organisational resilience.
As of December 2025, the Islamic State maintains 5 active provinces in Africa, collectively demonstrating:
sustained operational tempo across multiple and non-contiguous theatres;
adaptive local strategies shaped by distinct conflict environments;
The absence of a unified continental escalation, but persistent multi-node resilience.
Operational activity continues to concentrate in West Africa and the Sahel, while Central, East, and Southern African provinces maintain variable but durable capabilities. No continent-wide surge is observed during the reporting period; however, cumulative patterns indicate a structural and enduring threat with potential for regional spillover and episodic escalation.
Threat level: High
Trend: → / ↑ (stable with expansion potential)
Primary risk areas: Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Central Africa, Somalia, Mozambique
Time horizon: 3–6 months
Confidence level: Medium–High
Scope and Methodology
This Strategic Threat Outlook is based on:
systematic monitoring of Islamic State propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims);
reporting from sources in the field;
Integration of OSINT, SOCMINT, IMINT, and Digital HUMINT.
Sources include primary Islamic State media channels, open-source reporting, official statements, and local sources across affected regions.
Limitations
Incomplete or delayed reporting from conflict zones;
exaggeration or omission in group claims;
Propaganda bias and potential disinformation.
Where verification is not possible, this is explicitly noted.
Provincial Snapshots
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
Islamic State Sahel Province
Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)
Islamic State Somalia Province
Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM).
Overview – Islamic State in Africa
The Islamic State (IS) maintains a structured, resilient, and adaptive presence on the African continent, despite pressure from national and international counterterrorism operations. Africa remains the Islamic State’s main global theatre of operations, both in terms of frequency of attacks and capacity for territorial expansion, recruitment, and propaganda production.
Unlike other contexts, IS affiliates in Africa show a high degree of operational continuity, with the ability to carry out attacks using a wide range of tactics: assaults on villages, ambushes against armed and security forces, complex attacks against civilian and military infrastructure, kidnappings, deliberate fires, destruction of infrastructure, and terror campaigns targeting specific religious and community groups. In particular, systematic attacks against Christian villages and civilians are an almost exclusively African feature of Islamic State-linked jihadism, with a significant intensification observed in recent months.
The epicentre of this dynamic remains sub-Saharan and central-eastern Africa, with particularly worrying developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, where IS affiliates have demonstrated not only a capacity for sustained violence, but also a growing level of coordination, intermittent territorial control, and integration with local criminal economies. In such contexts, violence is not episodic but part of a strategy of progressive erosion of state authority, exploiting structural fragility, socio-economic marginalisation, inter-community conflicts, and governance vacuums.
On March 20, 2025, the Islamic State officially announced the launch of a new military campaign, called “Burning Camps,” with a stated focus primarily on Africa. The areas of reference include Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Mozambique in particular, but the narrative and timing of the attacks suggest a broader campaign, conceived as a tool for simultaneous pressure on multiple theatres. The campaign is characterised by the systematic destruction of villages, farmland, and subsistence infrastructure to destabilise the social fabric, causing forced displacement and amplifying discontent toward central governments.
The strategy remains consistent with the Islamic State’s operating model: creating chronic instability, delegitimising the state, presenting itself as an alternative (or inevitable) actor, and exploiting chaos to facilitate recruitment, logistical support, and territorial entrenchment. In this sense, IS does not aim exclusively at permanent territorial conquest, but at fluid and opportunistic control, sufficient to maintain freedom of manoeuvre and offensive capability.
Currently, the Islamic State is actively and continuously operating in at least eight African countries, with monthly variations in geographical distribution and intensity of activities. During the period under review, the organisation has demonstrated its ability to concentrate its efforts in a smaller number of theatres without losing overall capacity, a sign of a decentralised but functional structure.
A central and often underestimated element is the propaganda dimension. Every significant attack has been followed by intense media activity. In the month analysed, the Islamic State disseminated a significant volume of content—photographs, videos, and press releases—through its central channels, in particular the Amaq news agency and the weekly al-Naba. Propaganda is not limited to claims of responsibility but constructs a narrative of success, resilience, and inevitability, aimed at both local supporters and a global jihadist audience.
In summary, the African picture shows an Islamic State that is not in decline but in a phase of adaptive consolidation, capable of absorbing losses, reorienting priorities, and exploiting the structural weaknesses of local contexts. For intelligence, security, and political and military decision-makers, Africa is not a secondary front but the current centre of gravity of the threat posed by the Islamic State.
Islamic State Activities — December 2025
In December 2025, the Islamic State’s activity in Africa confirmed a now structural pattern: multi-theater persistence, high tactical flexibility, and the prevalence of “soft” or semi-protected targets in contexts where the state struggles to ensure territorial control and population protection.