Daniele Garofalo Monitoring

Daniele Garofalo Monitoring

JNIM — Strategic Threat Outlook | December 2025

Operational Trends, Risk Assessment, and Forecast

Daniele Garofalo's avatar
Daniele Garofalo
Jan 07, 2026
∙ Paid

Executive Intelligence Summary

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) remains one of the most significant jihadist threats in the Sahel and increasingly along the coastal West African corridor.

The group continues to demonstrate:

  • sustained operational capability across Mali and Burkina Faso;

  • expanding pressure towards Niger, Benin and Togo;

  • Strategic alignment with al-Qaeda’s regional objectives.

While no abrupt escalation is observed in December 2025, current activity patterns suggest a persistent and adaptive threat, with potential for geographic spillover and sustained instability over the next 3–6 months.

Threat level: High
Trend: ↑ (gradual expansion)
Primary risk areas: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger; emerging pressure on Benin and Togo
Time horizon: 3–6 months
Confidence level: Medium–High


Scope and Methodology

This Strategic Threat Outlook is based on:

  • systematic monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims);

  • reporting from sources in the field;

  • OSINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, and Digital HUMINT integration.

Sources include primary JNIM media channels, open-source reporting, official statements, and local sources.


Limitations

  • Incomplete or delayed reporting from conflict areas;

  • exaggeration or omission in group claims;

  • Potential propaganda bias and disinformation.

Where verification is not possible, this is explicitly noted.


Overview and Security Threat Assessment

The operating environment in Mali and across the central Sahel remains characterised by persistent governance deficits, chronic socioeconomic vulnerability, and uneven state presence. These structural conditions, long evident in northern Mali and historically exploited by autonomy-oriented and separatist movements, continue to constitute the primary enabling factors for armed mobilisation. In this context, jihadist recruitment is less a function of large-scale ideological adherence than of the ability to convert local grievance systems into mechanisms of compliance, protection, and mobilisation. Where the state is absent, predatory, or inconsistent, armed actors capable of imposing order, resolving disputes, and regulating daily life retain a decisive advantage. This dynamic, widely documented in international analytical and academic literature on Sahelian insurgencies, remains central to understanding the durability and expansion of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

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JNIM remains the most capable Salafi-jihadist actor in the central Sahel. Established in March 2017 through the merger of Ansar Dine, Katibat Macina, al-Mourabitoun, and AQIM’s Sahara branch, the group has evolved into a federated coalition rather than a hierarchically rigid organisation. It operates primarily in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while periodically extending operational pressure toward coastal states and peripheral borderlands. Analytically, JNIM is best understood as a hybrid insurgent structure combining guerrilla warfare, selective governance, and political signalling. Its resilience derives from a decentralised operational architecture, strong social embedding through local intermediaries, and a pragmatic strategic culture that prioritises survivability and influence over symbolic or purely spectacular violence.

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