Daniele Garofalo Monitoring

Daniele Garofalo Monitoring

Strategic Threat Outlook | JNIM — January 2026

Operational Trends, Risk Assessment, and Forecast

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Daniele Garofalo
Feb 10, 2026
∙ Paid

Executive Intelligence Summary

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) remains one of the most capable and strategically adaptive jihadist actors in the Sahel, representing a persistent and evolving threat to state authority across Mali and Burkina Faso, with sustained operational pressure extending into western Niger and early indicators of spillover toward coastal West Africa.

Recent operational data in January 2026 confirm that JNIM is not in a phase of decline or containment. On the contrary, the coalition continues to demonstrate a high degree of operational resilience, geographic dispersion, and tactical flexibility. The increase in attack volume in January 2026, combined with consistent targeting of regular armed forces, auxiliary militias, and foreign security partners, underscores JNIM’s ability to regenerate operational tempo after short periods of relative normalization. This resilience highlights the importance of sustained, adaptable responses from the audience.

The group’s activity reflects a deliberate strategy of institutional attrition rather than episodic escalation. JNIM’s operations are designed to degrade state mobility, hollow out local security architectures, and impose sustained pressure on economically and politically significant corridors, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. The parallel expansion of operations into western Niger, alongside continued probing toward Benin and Togo, suggests a widening operational horizon aimed at stretching state response capacity and exploiting cross-border depth rather than seeking immediate territorial conquest. This underscores the need for continued regional vigilance and adaptive strategies for the audience.

At the strategic level, JNIM’s campaign remains closely aligned with al-Qaeda’s regional doctrine: prioritizing longevity, local embedding, and political relevance over symbolic mass-casualty attacks. The group’s consistent use of propaganda, local-language messaging, and rapid claim attribution further reinforces its posture as a durable insurgent actor seeking to normalize de facto authority and compel local accommodation.

The persistence and breadth of activity point to a high, structurally embedded threat environment. The trajectory is best described as gradual expansion and consolidation, not volatility-driven spikes, warranting sustained vigilance and adaptive countermeasures rather than short-term crisis responses. This emphasizes the need for the audience to remain alert and flexible in their strategic approach.

Threat level: High
Trend: ↑ (gradual expansion and consolidation)
Primary risk areas: Mali, Burkina Faso, western Niger; emerging pressure toward Benin and Togo
Time horizon: 3–6 months
Confidence level: Medium–High


Scope and Methodology

This Strategic Threat Outlook is based on:

  • systematic monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims);

  • reporting from sources in the field;

  • OSINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, and Digital HUMINT integration.

Sources include primary JNIM media channels, open-source reporting, official statements, and local sources, ensuring a comprehensive and credible basis for analysis.


Limitations

  • Incomplete or delayed reporting from conflict areas;

  • exaggeration or omission in group claims;

  • Potential propaganda bias and disinformation.

Where verification is not possible, this is explicitly noted.


Overview and Security Threat Assessment

The operating environment in Mali and across the central Sahel remains characterised by persistent governance deficits, chronic socioeconomic vulnerability, and uneven state presence. These structural conditions, long evident in northern Mali and historically exploited by autonomy-oriented and separatist movements, continue to constitute the primary enabling factors for armed mobilisation. In this context, jihadist recruitment is less a function of large-scale ideological adherence than of the ability to convert local grievance systems into mechanisms of compliance, protection, and mobilisation. Where the state is absent, predatory, or inconsistent, armed actors capable of imposing order, resolving disputes, and regulating daily life retain a decisive advantage. This dynamic, widely documented in international analytical and academic literature on Sahelian insurgencies, remains central to understanding the durability and expansion of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

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