Ittehad-ul-Mujahidin Pakistan (IMP) — Strategic Threat Outlook | November 2025
Emerging Actor, Operational Trends, and Risk Assessment
Executive Intelligence Summary
Ittehad-ul-Mujahidin Pakistan (IMP) represents a low-visibility but potentially destabilising jihadist actor within Pakistan’s militant landscape, operating at the intersection of ideological fragmentation, rivalry with established groups, and external influence.
As of November 2025, available indicators suggest:
limited but persistent operational activity;
ideological and organisational contestation with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP);
suspected but not fully verifiable linkages with al-Qaeda–aligned networks.
IMP does not currently demonstrate the operational scale of major jihadist actors; however, its evolution trajectory warrants monitoring due to the risk of convergence, absorption, or escalation through external support.
Threat level: Low–Medium
Trend: → (stable with escalation potential)
Primary risk areas: Pakistan
Time horizon: 3–6 months
Confidence level: Low–Medium.
Scope and Methodology
This Strategic Threat Outlook is based on:
monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims);
reporting from sources in the field;
integration of OSINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, and Digital HUMINT.
Sources include primary material disseminated through IMP-affiliated channels, open-source reporting, official statements, and local sources.
Limitations
Limited availability of independently verifiable data;
potential exaggeration or omission in group claims;
propaganda bias and disinformation risks;
uncertainty regarding organisational cohesion and external support.
These limitations are central to the assessment and are explicitly reflected in confidence levels and scenarios.
Overview: Formation, Structure, and Strategic Positioning of Ittehad-ul-Mujahidin Pakistan (IMP)
In early April 2025, the formation of a new jihadist militant alliance in Pakistan—Ittehad-ul-Mujahidin Pakistan (IMP)—was publicly announced, marking a significant development within the country’s fragmented militant landscape. The alliance represents the formal unification of three established Pakistani jihadist factions: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGB), Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), and Harkat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP).
The announcement, disseminated simultaneously on 11 April 2025 through the official media channels of all three constituent groups, framed the creation of the IMP as a unified jihadist front aimed at “raising the word of Allah, supporting the oppressed, and conducting armed struggle under a shared ideological and organisational structure.” The founding communiqué designated Mahmood ul-Hasan as the official spokesperson of the alliance and introduced Sada-e-Ghazwat-ul-Hind as its centralised media wing. From this point onward, attack claims, communiqués, and propaganda outputs from the constituent factions were issued exclusively under the IMP brand, indicating a deliberate effort to subsume pre-existing identities into a single operational and narrative framework.
From an operational perspective, the IMP rapidly demonstrated a degree of tactical ambition and technological adaptability that exceeded the recent baseline of its predecessor groups. The execution of multiple high-profile attacks—some employing emerging technologies such as commercially adapted unmanned aerial systems (UAS)—combined with multilingual propaganda releases in Urdu, Pashto, and English, suggests a calculated attempt to project operational sophistication, ideological coherence, and transregional relevance. This communication strategy mirrors broader jihadist trends aimed at signalling maturity, deterrence capacity, and alignment with global jihadist narratives rather than purely local insurgency dynamics.
Ideological Contestation and Rivalry with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
The emergence of the IMP triggered a rapid and discernible ideological response from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has long positioned itself as the primary—and arguably exclusive—representative of jihadist militancy within Pakistan. While avoiding explicit reference to the IMP, the TTP disseminated a series of doctrinal messages through its official daily publication, Bunyanum Marsoos. Central among these was a written version of a speech by TTP emir Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, emphasising the necessity of unity under a single leadership, a single banner, and a centralised command structure.
The speech invoked the Afghan Taliban’s success as a model rooted in discipline, hierarchical authority, and organisational cohesion, while warning that fragmentation and parallel jihadist projects had historically produced strategic failure. Although couched in doctrinal rather than overtly confrontational terms, the subtext was unambiguous: the TTP perceives the IMP as a rival pole threatening its narrative primacy, recruitment base, and territorial influence. The resulting ideological contest between the two actors revolves not only around legitimacy and doctrinal authority, but also around control over militant ecosystems in Pakistan’s northwestern regions.