Security Risk Monitoring and Threat Assessment of JNIM in Africa

Military Operations July 2025

In recent years, Saharan and Sahelian areas have become increasingly important in threat assessment and risk expansion, particularly concerning Salafist-jihadist terrorism.

This report examines and analyses the military operations of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in Africa.

Date: July 2025

Method: Monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims) and reports from sources in the field.

Organisations/groups:

• Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

Allied/Affiliated: Al-Qaeda.

Activity area:

• Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Togo (activities have also been recorded in the past year in the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Mauritania or on their borders).

Overview and Security Threat Assessments:

The many problems of popular discontent, economic and social vulnerabilities, etc. have been the basis of support for independence movements in the North in the past. They are also the basis for the recruitment of jihadist organisations today. The strongest of these is undoubtedly Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims - JNIM), a coalition of Salafist-jihadist rebel groups operating in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, but with attacks also conducted in recent years in Togo, Ivory Coast, Benin and Senegal. JNIM was founded in March 2017 by the merger of four Salafist-jihadist groups in the Sahel: Ansar Dine led by Iyad Ag Ghali, Ahmed Kouffa's Katibat Macina, al-Mourabitoun and the Saharan branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The JNIM has become very adept at conveying the discontent and demands of the poorer sections of the population and ethnic minorities, particularly the Tuareg and Fulani. Since its inception, the JNIM has extended its operational territory throughout West Africa, conducting a sustained campaign of violence against civilians, local security forces, international armies and UN peacekeepers. The Qaedist affiliate in the area has managed to progressively insert itself into the complex Malian context, presenting itself as a credible and legitimate alternative to both the government in Bamako and the rebel movements. The JNIM managed to operationalise local demands, while the responses to the insurgency failed to address the political causes of the conflict and encouraged human rights violations.

The expansion of the JNIM in northern Mali and the Sahelian area is linked to social, political and economic factors rather than ideological factors. Jihadist groups have managed to create an alternative and more efficient welfare system than that of the central government, through the distribution of necessities and care services, employment, education (always linked to radicalism), the administration of justice, and the defence of communities and minorities. The latter has allowed the JNIM to assimilate, manoeuvre and revive the old nationalist claims of minorities, offering them political and logistical support and, in most cases, taking control of the territory and the fight against the government in Bamako. The leadership of the Qaedist group was assumed by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the most influential Malian Tuareg leaders, former leader of Anṣār al-Dīn and former lieutenant of Osama bin Laden for Africa. Many minorities facilitate JNIM operations in Mali, and some spread outside Mali, giving the group access to a wide collaboration network. Over the years, JNIM has significantly increased its operations and attacks throughout the country, not only in the north but often pushing into neighbouring countries. The organisation uses a federalist and para-state organisational model, imposing direct control of the territory to better manage, directly or indirectly, the trafficking of migrants, drugs and weapons, which it exploits to feed its structure and finance its activities.