Daniele Garofalo Monitoring

Daniele Garofalo Monitoring

Security Risk Monitoring and Threat Assessment: Islamic State in Africa

Military Operations November 2025

Daniele Garofalo's avatar
Daniele Garofalo
Dec 19, 2025
∙ Paid
Daniele Garofalo Monitoring is registered with the Italian National ISSN Centre and the Centre for the Registration of Serial Publications (CIEPS) in Paris.
ISSN (International Standard Serial Number): 3103-3520
ORCID Code: 0009-0006-5289-2874

Objectives of the analysis: In recent years, African areas have become increasingly important for the expansion of the Islamic State, even more so than the Middle East. Africa must therefore be constantly monitored to accurately assess threats and risks of expansion. In Africa, in addition to the strong activity of al-Qaeda affiliates, there are five official Islamic State provinces. This report examines and analyses the military operations of all 5 provinces.

Date: November 2025

Methodology: monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims) and reports from sources in the field.

Sources: open sources, primary sources available on Islamic State channels and websites, official reports, and local sources in the field. The study utilises OSINT, SOCMINT, IMINT and Digital HUMINT sources.

Verification: cross-checking, date cross-checking, and use of local and international sources.

Limitations: incomplete information (sometimes reports and claims by groups exaggerate numbers or do not claim activities that have actually been carried out), bias in sources, possibility of propaganda and disinformation.

Structure of the analysis: The analysis is structured to provide a multi-layered assessment of Islamic State activity in Africa, integrating quantitative data, geospatial distribution, and qualitative intelligence analysis.

It opens with a general overview of the Islamic State’s operational presence in Africa, outlining strategic trends, organisational resilience, and the broader security environment in which the group operates.

This is followed by a monthly operational overview, focused on November 2025, detailing recent military activity, attack patterns, and shifts in operational tempo across the continent.

The core of the analysis combines quantitative assessment and visual analytics, including:

  • temporal analysis of attack frequency,

  • country-level and province-level breakdowns,

  • comparative month-on-month trends supported by graphs and statistics.

These datasets are then interpreted through thematic analytical paragraphs, examining tactical adaptation, target selection, geographic concentration, and the evolving balance between military and civilian-focused violence.

A dedicated comparative section (“What changed vs October 2025 / What stayed the same”) contextualises short-term fluctuations within longer-term trends, highlighting continuity, escalation dynamics, and tactical recalibration rather than isolated monthly variation.

The analysis concludes with two distinct but complementary sections:

  • Operational conclusions, synthesising empirical findings and identifying dominant theatres, modes of operation, and risk drivers;

  • Intelligence assessment and risk implications, providing forward-looking judgments relevant to intelligence services, military planners, policymakers, and travel/security risk professionals.

Throughout the report, visual material, data-driven insights, and analytical interpretation are integrated to support situational awareness, strategic decision-making, and threat forecasting.

Organisations/groups:

  • Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP);

  • Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel);

  • Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP);

  • Islamic State Somalia Province (IS-Somalia);

  • Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISM).

Allied/Affiliated: Islamic State

Activity area in Africa in November 2025:

  • Niger, Nigeria, DR Congo, Somalia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon.

Overview – Islamic State in Africa

The Islamic State (IS) maintains a structured, resilient, and adaptive presence on the African continent, despite pressure from national and international counterterrorism operations. Africa remains the Islamic State’s main global theatre of operations, both in terms of frequency of attacks and capacity for territorial expansion, recruitment, and propaganda production.

Unlike other contexts, IS affiliates in Africa show a high degree of operational continuity, with the ability to carry out attacks using a wide range of tactics: assaults on villages, ambushes against armed and security forces, complex attacks against civilian and military infrastructure, kidnappings, deliberate fires, destruction of infrastructure, and terror campaigns targeting specific religious and community groups. In particular, systematic attacks against Christian villages and civilians are an almost exclusively African feature of Islamic State-linked jihadism, with a significant intensification observed in recent months.

Image

The epicentre of this dynamic remains sub-Saharan and central-eastern Africa, with particularly worrying developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, where IS affiliates have demonstrated not only a capacity for sustained violence, but also a growing level of coordination, intermittent territorial control, and integration with local criminal economies. In such contexts, violence is not episodic but part of a strategy of progressive erosion of state authority, exploiting structural fragility, socio-economic marginalisation, inter-community conflicts, and governance vacuums.

On March 20, 2025, the Islamic State officially announced the launch of a new military campaign, called “Burning Camps,” with a stated focus primarily on Africa. The areas of reference include Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Mozambique in particular, but the narrative and timing of the attacks suggest a broader campaign, conceived as a tool for simultaneous pressure on multiple theatres. The campaign is characterised by the systematic destruction of villages, farmland, and subsistence infrastructure to destabilise the social fabric, causing forced displacement and amplifying discontent toward central governments.

This post is for paid subscribers

Already a paid subscriber? Sign in
© 2025 Daniele Garofalo Monitoring · Privacy ∙ Terms ∙ Collection notice
Start your SubstackGet the app
Substack is the home for great culture