Strategic Threat Outlook | Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin — March 2026

Operational Trends, Regional Risk, and Forecast

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin remains one of the most resilient and adaptive jihadist organizations in East Africa, with regional implications including destabilization of neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, increased cross-border violence, and potential spillover effects into regional security frameworks.

The group continues to prioritize attritional warfare, interdiction of government mobility, degradation of intelligence and special forces capabilities, and selective psychological signaling operations.

No structural fragmentation or operational collapse is observable. Counterterrorism pressure, including airstrikes and intelligence-led operations, has imposed costs but has not disrupted al-Shabaab’s regenerative capacity, rural embedment, or cross-border facilitation networks. This highlights the need for sustained, coordinated efforts to maintain regional stability and reinforce collective commitment.

Threat level: High
Trend: → Stable overall, with increased cross-border pressure toward Kenya
Primary risk areas: Southern and Central Somalia, cross-border counties in northeastern and coastal Kenya
Time horizon: 3–6 months
Confidence level: Medium–High

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Scope and Methodology

This Strategic Threat Outlook is based on:

• systematic monitoring of jihadist propaganda (videos, photos, statements, claims);

• reporting from sources in the field;

• Integration of OSINT, IMINT, SOCMINT, and Digital HUMINT, including analysis of propaganda, disinformation, and group claims, is essential to understanding al-Shabaab’s influence operations and countering their narrative effectively.

Sources include primary material disseminated through al-Shabaab–affiliated channels, open-source reporting, official statements, and local sources.

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Limitations

• Incomplete or delayed reporting from contested or remote areas;

• exaggeration or omission in group claims;

• Propaganda bias and potential disinformation.

Where verification is not possible, this is explicitly noted in the assessment.

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Overview and Security Threat Assessment

Despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts, external influences such as regional support and international engagement continue to impact al-Shabaab’s resilience, underscoring the need for comprehensive regional strategies.

Since mid-February 2025, al-Shabaab’s large-scale, coordinated offensives in central Somalia indicate a strategic shift from attritional violence to territorial contestation, requiring heightened vigilance among security stakeholders. The campaign targeted Middle Shabelle and Hiiran, focusing on Somali National Army positions, African Union forces, and clan militias, aiming to reverse 2022 territorial losses along strategic towns, supply routes, and population centers. A coordinated offensive in central Somalia marked a clear shift from attritional violence to territorial contestation. The campaign has primarily targeted the regions of Middle Shabelle and Hiiran, focusing on Somali National Army positions, African Union forces, and pro-government clan militias. The offensive represents a deliberate effort to reverse the territorial losses suffered during the 2022 Somali government–African Union campaign, particularly along strategic towns, supply corridors, and population hubs.

The operation began on 15 February 2025 with synchronized assaults against multiple Somali military installations, combining ground attacks, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and follow-on infantry maneuvers. Several towns and villages were temporarily seized, while numerous forward operating bases and camps were overrun or destroyed. The group systematically documented these operations through high-quality photo and video releases, indicating a deliberate information-operations component aimed at signaling momentum, inevitability, and state weakness.

Beyond kinetic activity, al-Shabaab continues to consolidate control through a multi-layered governance-and-coercion model, even in areas nominally held by the government. This includes:

• Political and religious penetration, leveraging clerics, mosques, Sharia courts, and sermons to normalize al-Shabaab authority and delegitimize federal institutions.

• Targeted assassinations of elders, district officials, mayors, and clan intermediaries, designed to decapitate local governance and deter collaboration with the state.

• Systematic taxation and extortion, including the collection of zakat in government-controlled zones, underscore the group’s parallel administrative reach.

• Narrative dominance, portraying the return of Sharia governance while framing the Somali government as corrupt, externally controlled, and incapable of providing security or justice.

During the fighting, both the United States Africa Command and Ethiopia conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab targets, following repeated requests for support from Mogadishu. While these strikes imposed tactical costs, they did not disrupt the insurgency’s overall operational tempo.

After consolidating gains and exerting sustained pressure in Middle Shabelle and Hiiran—areas where al-Shabaab retains deep logistical and social networks—the group is now expanding its focus toward Lower Shabelle and Bay regions. This shift suggests a phased campaign design aimed at stretching government forces, exploiting overextension, and reasserting insurgent dominance across multiple operational theatres.

Assessment: al-Shabaab actively shapes the battlespace through synchronized military, governance, and information operations, maintaining strategic initiative in key regions. Without sustained territorial control and effective governance, the threat remains high in 2025, with a credible risk of further territorial setbacks for the Somali state, actively shaping the battlespace and impacting regional stability. Its ability to synchronize military offensives, governance mechanisms, and information operations indicates that the group retains strategic initiative in key regions. In the absence of sustained territorial control, effective local governance, and disruption to al-Shabaab’s parallel administration, the threat trajectory for 2025 remains high and structurally persistent, with a credible risk of further territorial rollback by the Somali state.

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Al-Shabaab Activities – March 2026

In March 2026, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen maintained an operational posture consistent with the adaptive insurgency pattern observed in previous months, combining sustained ground pressure in Somalia with a selective regional deployment capability. Activity was primarily concentrated in the southern and central regions, particularly along the Lower Shabelle, Bay, Hiraan, and Middle Shabelle axes, which continue to represent the group’s operational core for mobility, logistics, and influence over local communities.