The Islamic State in East Asia, propaganda and objectives.

Analysis published in Akhbar al-Aan Tv Media on 17/09/2022 - https://www.akhbaralaan.net/news/columnists/2022/09/17/

The Islamic State (IS) officially has 14 provinces in operation, following new oaths received in March 2022. Although jihadist groups loyal to IS in East Asia, particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia, have suffered significant losses at the hands of their respective countries' security and counter-terrorism operations, they are still operating as the Islamic State of East Asia (ISEAP) province. Military activity and areas of operation have been reduced, as has propaganda activity, particularly on official channels, but the groups continue to propagandize, especially unofficially and locally, to increase recruitment. 

Organization

The Islamic State of East Asia consists of at least two major cells, both operating in the southern Philippines (Lanao del Norte, Marawi, Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon) and is composed of groups or factions conducting local operations and providing support, to militants and leaders such as the Maute Group (mainly in Lanao), Abu Sayyaf (the Indama/Bayali and Sawadjaan factions based in Basilan and Jolo), some factions of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (in the Maguindanao area and are: Ismael Abu Bakar (Imam Bongos), Abu Turaipe, Salahuddin Hassan and the Karialan faction), Ansharul Khilafah Philippines (Nilong Group, based in Sarangani and Cotobato), Daulah Islamiyah-ASG Sawadjaan (Patikul/Sulu area), Dawlatul Islamiyah-Maguindanao, Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik and Dawlatul Islamiyah-Torayfe Group. To these must be added Indonesian networks leagued to IS such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT - a jihadist Salafist group that has an umbrella structure with nine branches in different territorial areas: West Java, East Java, Central Java, Banten, Jakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, Sumatra, Aceh and Makassar), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD - a highly decentralized organization consisting of numerous independent cells, often not in contact with each other and active in the areas of Jakarta, West Java, East Java and West Nusa and Tenggara) and the Mujaheddin Indonesia Timur (MIT - operating an in the areas of Java and Sulawesi).

The leader of ISEAP is Abu Zacariah, former leader of the Maute Group.  Among the prominent leaders of ISEAP, the key to the group in its role as facilitator and financier, is undoubtedly Saifullah, an Indonesian national, who in addition to dealing with the recruitment, financing and weapons aspect, manages close ties with the Indonesian JAD and the Afghan Islamic State Province (ISKP).

Over the past two years, the group has gone through a long and difficult phase of crisis and readjustment. To date, it conducts its attacks against Philippine security forces or targets that serve to cause local sectarian clashes, as well as conducting kidnappings for ransom and local extortion to generate funding.

In addition to military operations, Abu Zachariah is relying heavily on boosting recruitment, especially in the Marawi area, among citizens disgruntled with the slow reconstruction of the city, and in the Balindong, Madalum and Piagapo areas where there are many MILF camps, in whose ranks there are many heavily armed separatist militants, unhappy with the agreement with the Manila government, and on reinvigorating the Indonesian, Malaysian and Thai networks of allies, agents and facilitators. 

Overall, the ISEAP networks (considering Filipino and Indonesian groups) have around 300-500 active members, mostly Filipinos, but also Indonesians, Thais and Malays, a number that would be doubled if ISEAP's leadership succeeded in uniting all groups under one central leadership stably and concretely.

Objectives and operations

ISEAP's primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic State governed by Sharia law in the Muslim areas of the Philippines and Indonesia. Its secondary objective is its expansion beyond the Philippines into a wider area including Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. 

ISEAP continues to conduct terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets in the Philippines to achieve its goals. Tactics employed include armed assaults, assassinations and attacks, suicide bombings, and attacks on economic targets. In 2021, ISEAP conducted and claimed 16 attacks in the Philippines and four with its cells in Indonesia. On 18 February 2022, they also claimed their first attack related to the “economic warfare” strategy, destroying an electrical tower. From January to June 2022, ISEAP conducted 7 attacks in the Philippines, the last one claimed on 26 May 2022 on Amaq News, in which they claimed an attack in the Philippines, in Datu Salibo in Maguindanao, claiming to have killed and wounded 16 members of the Philippine army. Since the new leader is Abu Zachariah, ISEAP has slightly increased its operations, but its main objective is still to conduct a few operations and maintain a low profile by prioritizing recruitment and training.

Propaganda

The Islamic State’s official propaganda in the last two years as far as ISEAP is concerned has focused exclusively on claims published in Amaq News Agency and on non-constant appearances in al-Naba Newspaper, or with the dissemination of small photo sets especially during the Eid period and Ramadan.

In 2022, coinciding with the death of the previous Islamic State leader, there was increased visibility of the group. After the announcement of the new caliph by the Islamic State (IS) in March 2022, in the audio of spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir disseminated by the central leadership through al-Furqan Media, all IS provinces still active started to disseminate photos and short videos to pledge allegiance to the new leader Abu Al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraysh. The province of the Islamic State of East Asia (ISEAP) disseminated its oath via a photo report by Amaq News Agency on 11 March, showing photos of at least two operational cells. On 3 April, on the other hand, a 7-minute video was released showing two cells with at least 40 to 50 fighters swearing allegiance to the new leader of the Islamic State. Over the past year, however, more dissemination of images referring to the daily life of ISEAP militants has come from unofficial channels such as East Asia Knights and Annajiyah Media Center, as well as numerous private channels in Filipino, Malay, Indonesian, and Thai languages, mainly disseminated on lesser-used and well-known platforms such as Tam-Tam, Element, and Hoop Messagero. These channels, in contrast to official propaganda, show moments when militants, both men and women, are engaged in physical training, martial arts, fundraising, provisioning with food and supplies, recruiting, collecting and cleaning weapons, and training with different types of weaponry.

The material disseminated by these channels is not always new but often a collage of old photos or videos, but its dissemination, often in different languages besides Filipino and Indonesian, such as Malay, Thai, and English, is useful for the primary objective of online recruitment and dissemination of propaganda on the ground, necessary to show that the group is still active.

Conclusions

The risk associated with ISEAP must be assessed over the long term. To date, it appears unlikely that the Asian militants will be able to mount a major offensive in the various areas in which they operate, but signs of risk and threat are present. Clandestine activities such as recruitment, training and financing remain widespread and the low number of attacks could only be due to the need to keep a low profile to organize and settle down after the heavy losses and defeats suffered in the last three years. Filipino and Indonesian jihadist groups thrive in ungoverned spaces, where they can replace the central government. ISEAP not only exploits online propaganda but also continues to recruit on the ground, focusing as mentioned above on Marawi IDPs living in displacement camps, as well as among disaffected Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) fighters, and family and clan networks.  With Abu Zachariah's assumption of leadership, ISEAP's power centre is now run by the Maute Group, which will have to face the challenge of managing the various local Filipino and Indonesian jihadist groups loyal to the Islamic State, in particular the larger groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and the Indonesian groups. Abu Zachariah is facing difficulties related to the diminishing influence of IS ideology, in the region mainly supported by local insurgencies, and that of providing a strong and unified target for all jihadist and separatist groups to consolidate his leadership. Strengthening ISEAP and its command depends heavily on its ability to counter the counter-terrorism operations that have hit the Asian group hard over the past two years and to create long-term strategies to strengthen funding networks, military operations, recruitment, gain local popular support, defend its strongholds, and revive the various armed groups loyal to IS in Indonesia and the Philippines.