Why is the US targeting Ansar al-Islam in Syria?

On Nov. 27, 2024, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary Armed Forces and Opposition, in cooperation with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its al-Fateh al-Mubin joint operations room “Management of Military Operations,” launched the largest military operation in recent years against regime-controlled areas in northern and northwestern Syria, “Deterring Aggression.”

The attack in a surprise offensive led to the seizure of most of Aleppo, the country's second largest city, all of its governorate, Idlib governorate, and now targets Hama.

Alongside the HTS and the rebel and opposition factions, however, many jihadist groups are active militarily, often leading the advances and conquests. These jihadist groups, however, are aligned with or integrated into HTS brigades.

The only jihadist group operating in the Idlib area that is not aligned or integrated into HTS is Ansar al-Islam, which despite having the goal of toppling the Assad regime, is not taking part in the military offensive.

The reasons for this can be traced to the strained relations between Ansar al-Islam and HTS, Ansar al-Islam's refusal to accept the rules of the al-Fateh al-Mubin operations room, the group's reluctance to fight alongside rebel and opposition forces, which the group criticizes for their politics, ideology and proximity to Turkey.

The group, in addition, at the end of September 2024, as local Syrian media reported, was struck by U.S. MQ-9 drone, which targeted a military headquarters of the jihadist group near Jabal al-Akrad, close to the lines of contact with Syrian government forces in the al-Ghab plain in Hama governorate. The counterterrorism operation focused attention on this particular constellation in the “jihadist galaxy.”

The US attack aimed at decapitating Ansar al-Islam’s operational capabilities, and according to news reports and analysts, several of the group's leaders were killed.

In an interview earlier this month, however, Abu Louay al-Shami, a Syrian Ansar al-Islam leader who joined the group in 2011, said, “Only one of the nine was a leader. The others were simply brother fighters. The US lies to exaggerate what they did.”

Ansar al-Islam, with some 250 to 300 active fighters largely near and around rebel-held Idlib province, is a Salafist-jihadist group formed in September 2001 in Iraqi Kurdistan. Until 2019, it also operated in Iraq proper, targeting the Iraqi army, Kurdish militias and US forces. Cadres and fighters from the group then traveled to Syria to join the Syrian branch, which was established in 2011 after the outbreak of the civil war there that year.

The group initially settled and set up training camps in northeastern Syria, in al-Hawl, al-Hasakah governorate, and in 2012 expanded to Raqqa. It began operations against the government of President Bashar al-Assad on the outskirts of Damascus and in the Quneitra countryside, in the southwest. The group then moved into Idlib and northern Hama and Latakia beginning in 2014.

Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds initially constituted Ansar al-Islam's base, but over the years in Syria, it attracted increasing numbers of non-Kurdish fighters. According to Shami, non-Kurdish fighters have now become the majority. “Those who say we are an exclusively Kurdish group want to tarnish our image by presenting us as a national or ethnic movement,” he said.

Al-Qaeda connections

The motivation for US attacks against Ansar al-Islam stems from the group's jihadist ideology and its effectively being allied with al-Qaeda from 2003 until 2022.

Ansar al-Islam has drawn increased attention and scrutiny not only because of its alliance with al-Qaeda, but also because many of its leaders transitioned to the Islamic State (ISIS). Whereas ISIS focuses on global jihad and has declared the United States and the West its number one enemy — while also opposing the Arab regimes, the governments of the Gulf countries <Should this refer to the Arab governments in general or Gulf Arab governments? yes> — Ansar al-Islam's main objective is fighting the Syrian government and its allies.

“We are currently trying to focus our efforts against the Syrian regime, the Russians and the Iranians. At the moment we have no reason to move away from this battle,” Shami said. “This is our main battle . . . If we are defeated in Syria, we have to close ranks and rally our forces again, and then repeat the jihad in Syria.”

Despite Shami's assertion, Ansar al-Islam's ultimate goal is clearly a global jihad, as confirmed by several interviews with the group.

“For us, jihad is always global because it is not limited to artificial political boundaries within the global system of unbelief,” Shami said. “If there is a jihad elsewhere, the Ansar al-Islam group will fight there if it can. The universality of jihad is at the heart of Ansar al-Islam's doctrine . . . America is enemy number one.”

Ansar al-Islam began distancing itself from al-Qaeda last year after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant islamist armed group in Idlib province, moved against Hurras al-Din, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Nonetheless, the United Nations still classifies the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate.

“HTS wants to be the sole decision-maker on the ground,” Shami said. “It does not want anyone, group or faction, to oppose it, its decisions and its project. So if it feels that anyone, person, group or faction, might oppose its decisions, it will confront them in a hostile way and arrest or kill their leaders and soldiers. But this will not distract us from our goal.”

HTS repeatedly attacked Ansar al-Islam from 2021 to 2023 because it feared the group's closeness to Hurras al-Din and suspected that it had secretly sworn allegiance to the al-Qaeda leadership. Moreover, Ansar al-Islam refused to join HTS' operations room.

Building support

Because of Ansar al-Islam’s demonstrated resilience and resistance in the areas where it is active — building mosques, distributing food and economic aid, and constructing considerable defenses — HTS has met with only meager success in limiting the group's operations. It continues to enjoy strong popularity in northwestern Syria, in the vicinity of Jisr al-Shughour, in the western part of Idlib governorate; in the Kurdish area of Dweir, in the Al-Ghab plain, in the western section of Hama governorate; and in Jabal al-Turkman, northeast of Latakia governorate.

Ansar al-Islam's military operations and messaging have always been inconsistent, due to its financial and alliance problems. The group is strongly ideological and highly trained, but it lacks money to support the families of the fighters and the fighters themselves.

“We are forced into debt,” said Shami. “Now, the accumulated debts, which are growing for many of us, lead to legal problems, and we are subjected to trials by the courts in the liberated areas because of complaints from creditors.”

In 2023, Ansar al-Islam increased its military operations, taking advantage of the partial withdrawal of Russian mercenaries (redeployed to Africa and Ukraine) and of jihadist militants formerly linked to Hurras al-Din and Ansar al-Tawhid joining its ranks. It also ramped up related propaganda efforts, issuing statements, photos and videos exploiting local support where it operates and has bases.

Ansar al-Islam has shown an ability to reorganize itself when needed and has forged strong relationships with local communities and clans. It gains backers and loyalty through the support it provides as does its moderation and non-interference in local communities' affairs.

Over the past year, the group has tried to intensify attacks to exploit what it views as decreased support for the Syrian government and army by the Assad's main allies, as evidenced by the partial withdrawal of Russian mercenaries and Iran-backed Hezbollah's heightened focus on Israel.

Ansar al-Islam hopes increased attacks and pressure against Russian and Iranian positions or personnel will lead to Russian (which provides air support) and Iranian military disengagement from northwestern Syria, thus increasing the chances of it engaging directly with the Syrian army and pro-government militias from a position of military advantage or at least not disadvantage.

For now, jihadism for Ansar al-Islam takes the form of targeting the Syrian government and its allies through a local armed struggle. Despite Ansar al-Islam's current focus on Syria, the possibility of the group taking its local armed struggle global should not be dismissed.

Hurras al-Din militants have joined the group over the last two years, and the al-Qaeda affiliate has made clear that the United States is a primary target. It is therefore understandable why US forces have targeted a small group only operating in a pocket of Syria.

What counterterrorism operations should not underestimate in Syria are the increasingly strong alliances developing between different groups of “immigrants” in the northwest.

“Ansar al-Islam will cooperate with other jihadist groups if necessary for the victory of Muslims and Islam everywhere, and we will spare no effort to achieve this goal,” Shami said. “It is understood that these alliances and any agreements are not against the rules and contrary to our doctrine.”

Daniele Garofalo is a researcher and analyst on Jihadist Terrorism, Islamist Insurgents and Armed Groups. He is an expert in Monitoring Jihadist Media Channels and Islamist rebels and Armed Groups.

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