The aesthetics of violence: ISCAP infographics and three months of attacks in DR Congo.

Analysis of the ISCAP infographic in al-Naba 522

Daniele Garofalo Monitoring is registered with the Italian National ISSN Centre and the Centre for the Registration of Serial Publications (CIEPS) in Paris.

ISSN (International Standard Serial Number): 3103-3520

ORCID Code: 0009-0006-5289-2874

Objectives of the analysis: Objective of the analysis: analysis of the latest infographic published in al-Naba 522 dedicated to ISCAP DRC’s activities over the last three months.

Sources/Methodology: Direct analysis of propaganda and military information contained in the current issue (photos, statements, claims). The study utilises OSINT, SOCMINT and Digital HUMINT sources.

Limitations: Incomplete information (sometimes IS reports and claims in al-Naba tend to exaggerate numbers or often include attacks and photos not officially claimed in the past), bias of sources, possibility of propaganda and disinformation. Over the years, it has been noted that the attack data provided by the Islamic State in its propaganda is real and verifiable in the field; usually, the exaggeration is in the number of damages/deaths caused (in the case of unverified attacks, the author will indicate this directly in the analysis, as was the case for some attacks carried out in Uganda in early 2025).

Structure of the analysis: Overview of ISCAP in 2025 and brief analysis of the infographic published in the weekly magazine al-Naba 522, dedicated to attacks by the Islamic State in the Central African Province (ISCAP).

Overview

In the final months of 2025, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) intensified its campaign of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu. The group implemented a significant strategic shift: from rapid raids to a more stable mode of territorial control, using extortion, social domination, and agricultural and religious exploitation to consolidate its presence¹.

This restructuring is taking place against a backdrop of weakness in the Congolese state and a power vacuum generated in part by the recent advance of the M23 rebel group. ISCAP’s attacks appear to be partly a reaction to joint military pressure from Uganda and the DRC — in particular the “Operation Shujaa” offensive on the Ituri base camp known as “Madina”².

In terms of objectives, jihadist propaganda has taken on a strong sectarian component: ISCAP has clearly intensified its campaign against Christian communities, with systematic killings³.

The group also does not hesitate to target civilians, as evidenced by recent massacres (e.g. in Komanda, Ituri, and Ntoyo, North Kivu), also employing urban guerrilla tactics and infiltration along strategic routes⁴.

ISCAP represents a growing jihadist threat that is increasingly integrated into the global network of the Islamic State. Its ability to adapt, in operational, ideological and media terms, makes it a strategic player that exploits regional chaos to establish a lasting foothold⁵.

At the same time, its recruitment, abuse of minors and religious propaganda (described by some as “coercive dawa”) have also been the subject of attention from international justice centres⁶. This picture shows how, rather than being a marginal phenomenon, ISCAP is emerging as a sophisticated jihadist group that combines local logic with transnational objectives.